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01 Definability of initial segments
Saharon Shelah∗ and Akito Tsuboi†
1 Introduction
Let T be a first order theory formulated in the language L and P a new relation
symbol not in L. Let ϕ(P ) be an L ∪ {P}-sentence. Let us say that ϕ(P ) defines P
implicitly in T if T proves ϕ(P ) ∧ ϕ(P ′) → ∀x(P (x) ↔ P (x′)). Beth’s definability
theorem states that if ϕ(P ) defines P implicitlly in T then P (x) is equivalent to an
L-formula.
However, if we consider implicit definability in a given model alone, the situation
changes. For a more precise explanation, let us say that a subset A of a given modelM
of T is implicitly definable if there exists a sentence ϕ(P ) such that A is the unique set
with (M,A) |= ϕ(P ). It is easy to find a structure in which two kinds of definability
(implicit definability and first order definability) are different. For example, let us
consider the structureM = (N∪Z, <), where < is a total order such that any element
in the Z-part is greater than any element in the N-part. The N-part is not first order
definable in M , because the theory of M admits quantifier elimination after adding
the constant 0 (the least element) and the successor function to the language. But
the N-part is implicitly definable in M , because it is the unique non trivial initial
segment without the last element. On the other hand, for a given structure, we can
easily find an elementary extension in which two notions coincide.
In this paper, we shall consider implicit definability of the standard part {0, 1, ...}
in nonstandard models of Peano arithmetic (PA). It is needless to say that the
standard part of a nonstandard model of PA is not first order definable. As is stated
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above, there is a model in which every set defined implicitly is first order definable.
So we ask whether there is a model of PA in which the standard part is implicitly
definable.
In §1, we define a certain class of formulas, and show that in any model of PA
the standard part is not implicitly defined by using such formulas.
§2 is the main section of the present paper, we shall construct a model of PA in
which the standard part is implicitly defined. To construct such a model, first we
assume a set theoretic hypothesis ♦
Sλ
+
λ
, which is an assertion of the existence of a
very general set. Then we shall eliminate the hypothesis using absoluteness for the
existence of a model having a tree structure with a certain property.
In this paper L is a first order countable language. L-structures are denoted byM ,
N , Mi, · · · . We do not strictly distinguish a structure and its universe. A, B, · · · will
be used for denoting subsets of of some L-structure. Finite tuples of elements from
some L-structure are denoted by a¯, b¯, · · · . We simply write A ⊂ M for expressing
that A is a subset of the universe of M .
2 Undefinability result
Let us first recall the definition of implicit definability.
Definition 1 Let M be an L-structure. Let P be a unary second order variable. A
subset A of M is said to be implicitly definable in M if there is an L ∪ {P}-sentence
ϕ(P ) with parameters such that A is the unique solution to ϕ(P ), i.e. {A} = {B ⊂
M :M |= ϕ(B)}.
In this section L is the language {0, 1,+, ·, <}, and PA denotes the Peano arith-
metic formulated in L. We shall prove that the standard part is not implicitly defin-
able in any model of PA by using a certain form of formulas. We fix a model M of
PA, and work on M .
Definition 2 An L∪{P}-formula ϕ(y¯) (with parameters) will be called simple if it is
equivalent to a prenex normal formQ1x¯1 · · ·Qnx¯n[P (f(x¯1, ..., x¯n, y¯))→ P (g(x¯1, ..., x¯n, y¯))]
where Qi’s are quantifiers and f and g are definable functions. If Q1 = ∀ then ϕ will
be called a simple Πn-formula. Similarly it is called a simple Σn-formula if Q1 = ∃.
Remark 3 If P is an initial segment of M , then
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1. a1 ∈ P ∧ a2 ∈ P is equivalent to max{a1, a2} ∈ P ;
2. a1 ∈ P ∨ a2 ∈ P is equivalent to min{a1, a2} ∈ P .
An L-formula ϕ(x¯) is equivalent to a formula of the form P (f(x¯)), where f is a
definable function such that f(x¯) = 0 if ϕ(x¯) holds and f(x¯) = a (a is a nonstandard
element) otherwise. In what follows, an initial segment I ( M will be called a cut if
I is closed under successor. The statement that P is a cut is expressed by a simple
Π2-formula.
We shall prove that the standard part is not implicitly definable by a finite number
of simple Π2-formulas. In fact we can prove more.
Proposition 4 Let I0 be a cut ofM with I0 < a i.e. any element of I0 is smaller than
a. Let {ϕi(P ) : i ≤ n} be a finite set of simple formulas. If I0 satisfies {ϕi(P ) : i ≤ n},
then there is another cut I < a which also satisfies {ϕi(P ) : i ≤ n}.
Let us say that a cut I is approximated by a decreasing ω-sequence, if there is
a definable function f(x) with I = {a ∈ M : (∀m ∈ ω) a ≤ f(m)}. Similarly
we say that I is approximated by an increasing ω-sequence if there is a definable
function g(x) with I = {a ∈ M : (∃m ∈ ω) a ≤ g(m)}. Notice that no cut of M is
approximated by both a decreasing ω-sequence and an increasing ω-sequence.
Proof of Proposition 4: For i ≤ n, let ϕi(P ) have the form ∀x¯∃y¯[P (fi(x¯, y¯)) →
P (gi(x¯, y¯))]. By the remark just after Proposition 4, we can assume that I0 cannot
be approximated by a decreasing ω-sequence. We shall show that there is an initial
segment I with I0 ( I < a and M |=
∧
i≤n ϕi(I). Since I0 satisfies ϕi(P ), for each
b0 ∈ M with I0 < b0 < a, we have M |=
∧
i≤n ∀x¯∃y¯[fi(x¯, y¯) ∈ ω → gi(x¯, y¯) ≤ b0]. By
overspill there is an element b1 with I0 < b1 < b0 such that
M |=
∧
i≤n
∀x¯∃y¯[fi(x¯, y¯) ≤ b1 → gi(x¯, y¯) ≤ b0]
By choosing maximum such b1 < b0, we may assume that b1 ∈ dcl(a¯, b0), where
a¯ are parameters necessary for defining fi’s and gi’s. So we can choose an L(a¯)-
definable function, h(x) such that (i) I0 < b < a implies I0 < h(b) < b and (ii)
M |=
∧
i≤n ∀x∃y[fi(x¯, y¯) ≤ h(b)→ gi(x¯, y¯) ≤ b], for any nonstandard b ∈M .
By using recursion we can choose a definable function l(x) with l(m) = hm(a)
(the m-time application of h) for each m ∈ ω. Now we put
I = {d ∈M : (∀m ∈ ω) d ≤ l(m)}.
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Since m < h(m) holds for any m ∈ ω, by overspill, there is a nostandard m∗ such
that m∗ < h(m∗). This shows that I is an initial segment different from I0. Now we
show:
Claim For all i ≤ n and for all d¯ ∈M , there is e¯ ∈M such that
fi(d¯, e¯) ∈ I → gi(d¯, e¯) ∈ I.
Let d ∈ M and i ≤ n be given. We can assume that ∀y(fi(d¯, y¯) ∈ I) holds in
M . So by the definitions of I and l, for all k ∈ ω, we have M |= ∀y(fi(d¯, y¯) ≤ l(k)).
Hence, for some nonstandard k∗ ∈M with k∗ ≤ l(k∗), we have
M |= ∀y¯(fi(d¯, y¯) ≤ l(k
∗)).
On the other hand, by our choice of h and l, we can find e¯ with
M |= fi(d¯, e¯) ≤ l(k
∗)→ gi(d¯, e¯) ≤ l(k
∗ − 1).
Hence, for this e¯, we have gi(d¯, e¯) ≤ l(k
∗ − 1) ∈ I.
Corollary 5 The standard part is not implicitly definable by a finite number of simple
Σ3-formulas.
3 Definability result
In this section we aim to prove the following theorem:
Theorem 6 There is a model of PA in which the standard part is implicitly definable.
Instead of proving the theorem, we prove a more general result (Theorem 10), from
which Theorem 6 easily follows. For stating the result, we need some preparations.
We assume the language L contains a binary predicate symbol <, a constant
symbol 0 and a unary function symbol S. We fix a complete L-theory T with a
partial definable function F (x, y) such that the following sentences are members of
T :
• < is a linear order with the first element 0;
• For each x, S(x) is the immediate successor of x with respect to <;
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• ∀y1, ..., yn∀z1, ..., zn∃x(
∧
i 6=j yi 6= yj →
∧n
i=1 F (x, yi) = zi) (for n ∈ ω).
Remark 7 Any completion of PA satisfies our requirements stated above.
Let P be a new unary predicate symbol not in L. Throughout this section ψ∗(P ) is
the conjunction of the following L ∪ {P}-sentences:
1. P is a cut (non-empty proper initial segment closed under S), i.e.
¬(∀xP (x)) ∧ P (0) ∧ ∀x∀y(P (y) ∧ x < y → P (x)) ∧ ∀x(P (x) → P (S(x)));
2. For no x and z with P (z), is {F (x, y) : y < z} ∩ P unbounded in P , i.e.
∀x∀z[P (z) → ∃w(P (w) ∧ ∀y(P (F (x, y))→ F (x, y) < w))].
It is clear that in any model M of T , the “standard” part I = {Sn(0) : n ∈ ω}
satisfies ψ∗(P ), i.e. the sentence ψ∗(P ) holds in the L ∪ {P}-structure (M, I).
Definition 8 A model M of T will be called ψ∗-appropriate if the following two
conditions are satisfied:
1. M 6= {Sn(0) : n ∈ ω};
2. If (M, I) |= ψ∗(P ) then (a) I = {Sn(0) : n ∈ ω} or (b) I is definable in M by
an L-formula with parameters.
Remark 9 In case that T is a completion of PA, the part (b) of the condition 2 in
the above definition does not occur, because in any model of T no definable proper
subset is closed under S.
Theorem 10 There is an appropriate model of T ∗.
We shall prove the theorem above by a series of claims. For a period of time, we
fix an infinite cardinal λ. First we need some definition.
Definition 11 Let M be a model of T and ϕ(x, a¯) a formula with parameters from
M . We say that ϕ(x, a¯) is ΓsindF -big (in M) if in some (any) |T |
+-saturated model
N ≻ M there is A ⊂ N with |A| ≤ |T | such that for any finite number of distinct
elements a1, ..., an ∈ N \ A, and any elements b1, ..., bn ∈ N , we have
N |= ∃x[ϕ(x, a¯) ∧
n∧
i=1
F (x, ai) = bi].
In the above definition, if λ = ℵ0, we replace the condition |A| ≤ |T | by |A| < ℵ0.
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Let us briefly recall the definition of bigness defined in [2]. Let R /∈ L be a unary
predicate symbol. A statement (or an infinitary L ∪ {R}-sentence) Γ(R) is called a
notion of bigness for T , if any model M of T satisfies the following axioms, for all
formulas ϕ(x, y¯) and ψ(x, y¯) (where Γ(ϕ(x, y¯)) means that setting R(x) = ϕ(x, y¯) [so
y¯ is a parameter] makes Γ true):
1. ∀y¯(∀x(ϕ→ ψ) ∧ Γ(ϕ) → Γ(ψ));
2. ∀y¯(Γ(ϕ ∨ ψ) → Γ(ϕ) ∨ Γ(ψ));
3. ∀y¯(Γ(ϕ)→ ∃≥2xϕ);
4. Γ(x = x).
Now let Γ(ϕ) be the statement “ϕ is ΓsindF -big”. Then this Γ satisfies the above
four axioms: It is easy to see that our Γ saitsfies Axioms 1, 3 and 4. So let us
prove Axiom 2. Suppose that neither ϕ nor ψ are big. Let M be a model of T
and N ≻ M be |T |+-satrurated. Let A be a subset of N of cardinality ≤ |T |.
Since ϕ is not big, A cannot witness the definition of bigness, so there are a finite
number of elements a1, ..., an ∈ N \A with no repetition and b1, ..., bn ∈ N such that
N |= ∀x[
∧
i≤n F (x, ai) = bi → ¬ϕ(x)]. Since ψ is not big, A
′ = A∪{a1, ..., an} cannot
witness the definition of bigness, hence there are an+1, ..., am ∈ N \ (A ∪ {a1, ..., an})
with no repetition and bn+1, ..., bm ∈ N such that N |= ∀x[
∧
n+1≤i≤m F (x, ai) = bi →
¬ψ(x)]. So N |= ∀x[
∧
i≤m F (x, ai) = bi → ¬(ϕ(x) ∨ ψ(x))]. Since A was chosen
arbitrarily, this shows that ϕ ∨ ψ is not big.
For simplicity we assume λ > |T |. (This assumption is for simplicity only.)
Claim A (Under ♦
Sλ
+
λ
+ ♦λ, where λ = λ
<λ, Sλ
+
λ = {δ < λ
+ : cf(δ) = λ}) There
are a continuous elementary chain 〈Mi : i < λ
+〉 of models of T and a sequence
〈ai : i < λ
+〉 of elements ai ∈Mi+1 \Mi such that
(a) |Mi| = λ;
(b) Mi is saturated except when ℵ0 ≤ cf(i) ≤ λ;
(c) tpMi+1(ai/Mi) is Γ
sind
F -big, i.e. each formula in it is Γ
sind
F -big.
(d) Mi ⊂ {F
Mi+1(ai, c) :Mi |= c < b} if b ∈Mi \ {S
n(0) : n ∈ ω},
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(e) if (C1, C2) is a Dedekind cut of M =
⋃
i<λ+ Mi of cofinality (λ
+, λ+) then C1 is
a subset of M definable with parameters. (A Dedekind cut of M of cofinality
(µ1, µ2) is a pair (C1, C2) such that (i) M = C1∪C2, (ii) ∀x ∈ C1∀y ∈ C2[x <
M
y], (iii) the cofinality of C1 with respect to < is µ1 and (iv) the coinitiality of
C2 (i.e. the cofinality of C2 with respect to the reverse ordering) is µ2.
Proof. See [2]. For more details, see [3].
Now we expand the language L by adding new binary predicate symbols. Let
L∗ = L ∪ {E1, E2, <les, <tr}. We expand the L-structure M defined in claim A to an
L∗-structure M∗ by the following interpretation. For a ∈M , let i(a) = min{i < λ+ :
a ∈Mi+1}.
1. EM
∗
1 = {(a, b) : i(a) = i(b)};
2. EM
∗
2 = {(a, b) : i(a) = i(b) and M |= (c < a ≡ c < b) for every c ∈Mi(a)},
In other words, (a, b) ∈ EM
∗
2 iff a and b realize the same Dedekind cut of
Mi(a)(=Mi(b));
3. <M
∗
lev = {(a, b) : i(a) < i(b)};
4. <M
∗
tr = {(a, b) : i(a) < i(b) and M |= (c < a ≡ c < b) for every c ∈ Mi(a)}.
The relation <tr defines a preorder on M
∗ and induces a tree structure on the E2-
equivalence classes. This tree structure (M∗/E2, <tr) is a definable object of M
∗eq.
(We do not use a new symbol for the order induced by <tr.) Simiarly <lev induces
a linear order on the E1-equivalence classes. Let R be the definable function which
maps aE2 to aE1. R is considered as a rank function which assigns a level to each
node of the tree. Then 〈<tr, <lev, R〉 is an L
∗-tree in the sense of [1]. A subset B
of M∗/E2 will be called a branch of the tree if (i) it is linearly ordered by <tr, (ii)
aE2 ∈ B and b ≤tr a imply bE2 ∈ B and (iii) the set {R(aE2) : aE2 ∈ B} of all levels
in B is unbounded in M∗/E1.
Claim B Every branch of the tree (M∗/E2, <tr, <lev, R) is definable in M
∗.
Proof. Let B be a branch of the tree (M∗/E2, <tr, <lev, R). We show that B is
definable in M∗. Let I be the <-initial segment determined by B, i.e.
I = {a ∈M∗ :M∗ |= (∀bE2 ∈ B)(∃cE2 ∈ B)[bE2 <tr cE2 ∧ a < c]}.
It is easy to see that I and B are interdefinable in M∗. In fact, we have bE2 ∈ B if
and only if there exist c ∈ I and d ∈M∗ \ I such that
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• bE2 intersects the interval [c, d],
• if bE2 ⊂ I then any other b
′
E2
with [c, d] ∩ I ∩ b′E2 6= ∅ has a strictly larger level
than bE2 and
• if bE2 ⊂M
∗ \ I then any other b′E2 with [c, d]∩ (M
∗ \ I)∩ b′E2 6= ∅ has a strictly
larger level than bE2 .
If the cofinality of (I,M∗ \ I) is (λ+, λ+), then I is definable inM by the property
(e) of Claim A, so B is definable in M∗. So we may assume that the cofinality is not
(λ+, λ+).
First suppose that cf(I) ≤ λ. Then we can choose a set {ai : i < λ} which is
cofinal in I. Choose j < λ+ with cf(j) = λ and {ai : i < λ} ⊂ Mj . If Mj \ I is
bounded from below in M∗ \ I, say by d ∈ M∗ \ I, then I is defined in M∗ by the
formula ∃y[x < y < d ∧ y <lev e], where e is an element from Mj+1 \Mj . So we
may assume that there is a set {a′i : i < λ} ⊂ Mj \ I which is coinitial in M
∗ \ I.
(We shall derive a contradiction from this. ) Let bE2 ∈ B with b /∈ Mj . Since the
other case can be treated similarly, we can assume that b ∈ I. Then bE2 is included
in some interval [0, ai]. By the definition of I, there is cE2 ∈ B such that bE2 <lev cE2
and ai < c. But then b and c determine different Dedekind cuts of Mj, hence b and
c are not comparable with respect to <tr. This contradicts our assumption that B is
a branch.
Second suppose that the coinitiality ofM∗ \ I is ≤ λ and that the cofinality of I is
λ+. As in the first case, we can choose j < λ+ such that Mj \ I is coinitial in M
∗ \ I.
Choose d ∈ I which bounds I ∩Mj from above and an element e ∈Mj+1 \Mj . Then
I is defined by the formula ∀y[d < y ∧ y <lev e → x < y]. Lastly the case where the
cofinality of (I,M∗ \ I) is (µ1, µ2) with µ1, µ2 ≤ λ is impossible by the definition of
branch.
Let T ∗ be the L∗-theory of M∗. Under the hypothesis of Claim A (i.e. ♦
Sλ
+
λ
etc),
we have proven the existence of M∗ |= T ∗ having a tree with the property stated
in Claim B. However, by the absoluteness (e.g. Thorem 6 in [1]), the existence of
such a model can be proven without the hypothesis. Moreover, as T ∗ is countable,
we can assume that relevant properities of M∗ expressed by one L∗ω1ω(Q)-sentence
are also possessed by such models. (Q is the quantifier which expresses “there are
uncountably many”.) Thus in ZFC we can show
Claim C There is a model N∗ |= T ∗ of cardinality ℵ1 that satisfies:
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1. The tree (N∗/E2, <tr) has no undefinable branch;
2. The set N∗/E1 of levels has the cardinality ℵ1, but for each b/E1 ∈ N
∗/E1,
{c/E1 : c/E1 <lev b/E1} is countable;
3. If I is a definable subset of N∗ with the Dedekind cut (I, N∗ \ I) of cofinality
(ℵ1,ℵ1), then I is definable in N ;
4. The clause (d) of Claim A, namely, for each level dE1 there is a ∈ N
∗ such that
if b ∈ N∗ \ {Sn(0) : n ∈ ω} then {F (a, c) : c < b} includes {c ∈ I : c ≤lev d}.
Claim D Let N∗ be a model of T ∗ with the properties stated in Claim C. Then the
reduct N of N∗ to the language L is ψ∗-appropriate.
Proof. Toward a contradiction, we assume that there is an undefinable (in the sense
of N) subset I ⊂ N with (N, I) |= ψ∗(P ) and I 6= {Sn(0) : n ∈ ω}. We show that the
cofinality of (I, N∗\I) is (ℵ1,ℵ1). Suppose that this is not the case. First assume that
the cofinality of (I, <) is less than ℵ1. As (N
∗/E1, <lev) has the cofinality ℵ1, there
is d/E1 such that {c ∈ I : c ≤lev d} is unbounded in I. Since I 6= {S
n(0) : n ∈ ω},
we can choose b ∈ I \ {Sn(0) : n ∈ ω}. By the fourth condition of Claim C, there is
a ∈ N∗ such that {F (a, c) : c < b} includes {c ∈ I : c ≤lev d}. So {F (a, c) : c < b}∩ I
is unbounded in I. This contradicts the last clause in the definition of ψ∗. Second
assume that the coinitiality of N∗ \ I is less than ℵ1. For a similar reason as in the
first case, we can find dE1 such that {c ∈ N
∗ \ I : c ≤lev d} is unbounded from below
in N∗ \ I. Also we can choose a ∈ N∗ and b ∈ I such that {F (a, c) : c < b} includes
{c ∈ I : c ≤lev d}. If I ∩ {F (a, c) : c < b} were bounded (from above) say by e ∈ I,
then I would be definable in N by the L-formula
ϕ(x, a, b, e)
def
≡ ∀z[(e < z ∧ ∃y(y < b ∧ z = F (a, y)))→ x < z],
contradicting our assumption that I is not definable. So I ∩ {F (a, c) : Mi∗ |= c < b}
is not bounded in I. Again this contradicts the last clause in the definition of ψ∗. So
we have proven that the cofinality of (I, N∗ \ I) is (ℵ1,ℵ1).
As in the proof of Claim B, we shall define a set {(bi)E2 : i < ℵ1} and definable
intervals Ji ⊂ N
∗ (i < ℵ1) such that for each i < ℵ1,
• Ji’s are decreasing;
• bi ∈ Ji, Ji ∩ I 6= ∅, Ji ∩ (N
∗ \ I) 6= ∅;
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• there is no element d ∈ Ji with d <lev bi.
Suppose that we have chosen dj’s and Jj ’s for all j < i. Since the cofinality of I and
the coinitiality of N∗ \ I are both ℵ1,
⋂
j<i Ji intersects both I and N
∗ \ I. Choose
b ∈
⋂
j<i Ji ∩ I and c ∈
⋂
j<i Ji ∩ (N
∗ \ I). Then we put Ji = {e ∈ N
∗ : N∗ |= b < e <
d}. Choose bi ∈ Ji of the minimum level. (Such bi exists and (bi)E2 is unique, because
every nonempty definable subset of N∗/E1 has the minimum element with respect
to <lev. If there are two such elements, they are distinguished by elements of lower
levels, contradicting the minimality.) We claim that {(bi)E2 : i < ℵ1} determines a
branch B = {cE2 : cE2 ≤tr (bi)E2 for some i}. For this it is sufficient to show that the
bi’s are linearly ordered by ≤tr. Let i ≤ i
′ < ℵ1. Then both bi and bi′ are members
of the interval Ji. Suppose that bi and bi′ are not comparable with respect to ≤tr.
They determine different Dedekind cuts of the elements of lower levels. So there is
an element c ∈ Ji with c <lev bi. This contradicts our choice of bi ∈ Ji. By our
assumption (the fourth condition in Claim C), the branch B = {(bi)E2 : i < ℵ1} is
definable in N∗. It is easy to see that I and B are interdefinable in N∗. So I is also
definable in N∗, hence I is definable in N by the third condition in Claim C. This
contradicts our assumption that I is undefinable in N .
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